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ScienceDirect4 We use the term ‘item’ to refer to an individual representation held
in WM. ‘Item’ is thus synonymous with ‘chunk’ [97] and ‘cognitive
object’ [98,7] which denote the same concept. There is ongoing debate
about whether items in WM are represented in discrete slots (items held
with high precision in a number of discrete memory locations), allocation
of continuous resources (items allocated limited resources in inverse
proportion to the total number of items in WM), or some hybrid of
the two frameworks (e.g. Refs. [78,74,79,80]). The models and general
approach that we discuss in this paper are not committed to either
architecture but could be used to test between the competing accounts
(see Section ‘Current directions’ below).Working memory (WM) refers to a set of processes that
makes task-relevant information accessible to higher-level
cognitive processes. Recent work suggests WM is
supported by a variety of information gating, updating, and
removal processes, which ensure only task-relevant
information occupies WM. Current neurocomputational
theory suggests WM gating is accomplished via ‘go/no-go’
signalling in basal ganglia-thalamus-prefrontal cortex
pathways, but is less clear about other subprocesses and
brain structures known to play a role in WM. We review
recent efforts to identify the neural basis of WM
subprocesses using the recently developed reference-back
task as a benchmark measure of WM subprocesses. Targets
for future research using the methods of model-based
cognitive neuroscience and novel extensions to the
reference-back task are suggested.
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Working memory and its subprocesses
Working memory (WM) refers to a set of processes
that makes task-relevant information accessible to
higher-level cognitive processes such as learning,
decision making, reasoning, and reading comprehen-
sion [1–3]. Working memory is extremely capacity-
limited, with current research suggesting that betweenwww.sciencedirect.com one and four items4 can be maintained in an activated
state in WM at a time [4–7]. This strict limit demands a
high degree of control over WM content, such that WM
must strike a balance between stability (i.e. protecting
the current contents of WM from irrelevant or distract-
ing information) and flexibility (i.e. keeping WM up-to-
date with new relevant information and removing
outdated information). This trade-off between stability
and flexibility [8–11] is a core feature of executive
control processes (e.g. cognitive control, conflict moni-
toring/resolution, task switching; [12]) and managing
the trade-off strongly depends on the brain’s dopamine
systems [13,14].
Prominent computational theories suggest that WM
resolves the stability-flexibility trade-off by operating
in two modes: An updating (gate-open) mode, which
allows new information to enter WM, and a maintenance
(gate-closed) mode, which prevents irrelevant and
distracting information from interfering with the cur-
rent contents of WM [15–22]. In the gate-open mode,
updating is further supported by two main subpro-
cesses: Item removal and item substitution, which
together ensure that only relevant information is kept
active in WM [23,24]. Together, these processes
allow WM to alternate modes between flexible (when
new information is encountered) and stable (when
distractors are encountered). This enables successful
performance in dynamic environments in which dis-
tractions are common and the relevance of information
frequently changes.
To-date, the most detailed neurocomputational account
of the gating mechanism controlling the trade-off
between updating and maintenance is the prefrontalCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2021, 38:57–65
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Illustration of the PBWM model. Gate opening is controlled by a
striatal ‘go’ signal that inhibits SNr and disinhibits thalamus and PFC,
enabling updating to occur. Gate closing is controlled by a striatal ‘no-
go’ signal that inhibits GPe, disinhibits SNr, which inhibits thalamus
and PFC, preventing updating. Extending this model to include
additional structures implicated in WM and cognitive control (e.g.
hippocampus, ventral tegmental area, anterior cingulate cortex) and
their role in WM subprocesses beyond gate opening/closing is a key
target for model-based cognitive neuroscience. Adapted from Hazy
et al. [26] with permission.
6 The PBWM model suggests a phasic dopaminergic signal from the
midbrain dopamine structures only in the early phases of a WM task
when the BG must learn when to update. Once WM updating rules arecortex-basal ganglia WM (PBWM) model (Figure 1;
[25–27]). In this model, gating is implemented via basal
ganglia (BG)-thalamus-prefrontal cortex (PFC) circuits
that control ‘go/no-go’ signalling. As illustrated in
Figure 1, gate opening is controlled by a striatal ‘go’
signal which inhibits substantia nigra pars reticulata
(SNr) and disinhibits thalamus, which in turn excites
PFC. This allows information to enter WM and updating
to occur. Gate closing5 is controlled by a striatal ‘no-go’
signal which inhibits external globus pallidus (GPe),
disinhibits SNr, and inhibits thalamus. This in turn
inhibits PFC, which prevents WM from being updated
(Figure 1; [26]). In short, the ‘go’ signal passes through
two inhibitory connections (striatum-SNr-thalamus),
which excites PFC, while the ‘no-go’ signal passes
through three inhibitory connections (striatum-GPe-
SNr-thalamus), which inhibits PFC. These circuits have
also been implicated in updating value representations in
reinforcement learning and value-based decision making,
suggesting a general neural mechanism for accomplishing
information gating ([16,28,29,26,20,30,22]).5 The PBWM model assumes that WM sits in the ‘gate-closed’/
maintenance mode by default. We note that this assumption is likely
too strong, since it implies that gate opening must always accompany
updating. Under this assumption the PBWM would fail to predict the
different gating costs to WM updating that occur in behavioural data (e.
g. Refs. [24,21]).
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2021, 38:57–65 The components of the PBWM model have received
broad support from functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) studies ([19,28,31–33,22,34]). For example,
activation in striatum and dorsolateral PFC has been
widely reported in tasks broadly involving WM updating
(e.g. Refs. [31–34]), while other work has localized activ-
ity specifically related to the updating and gating pro-
cesses rather than other WM processes. Roth et al. [22]
identified a frontoparietal network specifically involved in
updating, while Murty et al. [19] found selective engage-
ment of SN/ventral tegmental area (VTA), caudate, dor-
solateral PFC, and some areas of parietal cortex related to
the updating but not maintenance mode of WM. Striatal
dopamine-receptor expressing neurons and dopamine-
producing midbrain structures have also been implicated
in WM updating [19,28,33], and dynamic causal model-
ling suggests that BG plays a central role in gating
information to PFC [35]. Moreover, a number of cortical
areas (e.g. dorsolateral PFC, medial PFC, posterior pari-
etal cortex) have been linked to the maintenance mode of
WM but not updating ([22,36–38]). This is consistent
with the idea that tonic dopamine activity in PFC controls
the stability of WM representations whereas phasic dopa-
mine release in the striatum trains the BG when to open
the gate (via disinhibition of thalamus and PFC) to allow
information into WM6 [27].
Overall, these findings show that WM updating engages
cortico-striatal circuitry involving BG, midbrain, and PFC
structures broadly in line with the neurocomputational
mechanisms of the PBWM model [39,26] and more
general accounts of cognitive control (e.g. Ref. [40]).
However, as will be discussed, recent work highlights
that WM also depends on several important subprocesses
not accounted for in the PBWM, and on neural substrates
outside of the PBWM’s BG-thalamus-PFC pathways.
Modelling these processes and their neural basis is nec-
essary to achieve a complete neurocomputational under-
standing of WM.
This review discusses recent progress toward this goal.
We focus on recent efforts to link brain measurements
with behaviour on the reference-back task (Figure 2;
[24,21]), a WM-based decision-making task that pro-
vides separate behavioural measures of gate opening and
closing, as well as updating and substitution processes not
accounted for in the PBWM. In doing so, we suggest thatlearned, BG nuclei no longer rely on a phasic dopaminergic response but
control WM gating via the non-dopaminergic SNr. Any additional
dopaminergic input reflects either reward associations or a feedback-
based response which evaluates the updating process based on the
reward prediction error coded by the same neurons [84]. This response,
in the form of bursts and dips in dopaminergic release onto striatal
neurons, is thought to reinforce ‘go’ and ‘no-go’ activation, respectively.
www.sciencedirect.com
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Illustration of the reference-back task. On each trial, participants indicate whether the presented letter is same or different from the letter in the
most recent red frame. On reference (red frame) trials, participants must also update WM with the currently displayed letter. On comparison (blue
frame) trials, participants make the same/different decision but do not update WM. Comparing behavioural outcomes (e.g. response time, error
rate) between different trial types measures the cost of gate opening, gate closing, updating, and item substitution processes (see text for details).
Explaining these behavioural phenomena via computational cognitive models and establishing further links to neural data is a key goal of current
WM research. Adapted from Rac-Lubashevsky and Kessler [21] with permission.further progress can be made by applying the methods of
model-based cognitive neuroscience [41,42], which links brain
activity to behaviour via detailed computational models
of cognitive and neural processes [43–45]. Model-based
cognitive neuroscience generates detailed quantitative
theories that span multiple levels of abstraction (e.g.
behavioural, cognitive, neural). This provides greater
constraint on theory and leads to more robust and
detailed inferences. In particular, combining model-
based approaches with developments in ultra-high field
fMRI enables testing neurocomputational theories of
WM (such as the PBWM) with greater spatial and psy-
chometric precision than has previously been possible.
Applying these methods to the reference-back task pro-
mises a more detailed neurocomputational understanding
of WM than is currently available.
Measuring WM subprocesses with the
reference-back paradigm
Most laboratory tasks used to study WM (e.g. n-back,
delayed-match-to-sample) are designed to investigate the
capacity and temporal properties of WM but are unable to
differentiate the contribution of WM subprocesses to
observed behaviour ([24,46,47,48,21,22]). A recently
developed exception is the reference-back task [24,21],
which provides dissociable measures of core WM sub-
processes (gate opening, gate closing, updating, substitu-
tion) from behavioural choice-response time (RT) data.
To perform the reference-back, participants hold one of
two stimuli (e.g. an ‘X’ or ‘O’) in WM while deciding
whether a series of probes match the current item in WMwww.sciencedirect.com (Figure 2). On reference trials (indicated by a red frame
around the stimulus), the participant must update WM
with the currently displayed stimulus. On comparison
trials (indicated by a blue frame), the participant simply
compares the current stimulus to the one held in WM (the
one appearing in the most recent red frame) without
updating WM. Both reference and comparison trials
require a same/different decision but only reference trials
require updating. Comparing performance on reference
and comparison trials thus provides a behavioural mea-
sure of the cost of updating. By similar logic, switching
from comparison to reference trials requires opening the
WM gate (to allow for updating), while switching from
reference to comparison trials requires closing the WM
gate (to maintain the current contents). Gate opening is
measured by comparing trials on which participants
switch towards a reference trial to those where reference
trials are repeated. Likewise, gate closing is measured by
comparing trials on which participants switch towards a
comparison trial to those where comparison trials are
repeated. Finally, substitution is measured via the interac-
tion effect of trial type (reference/comparison) and match
type (same/different) and represents the cost of updating
a new item into WM.
The benchmark behavioural finding from the reference-
back task is that trials requiring additional WM processes
tend to have slower RTs and/or more frequent errors
than trials that do not require such processes
[24,47,49,21,50,51,52]. These costs are typically
interpreted as reflecting a combination of time required
for additional subprocesses to run outside of the same/Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2021, 38:57–65
60 Computational cognitive neurosciencedifferent decision stage, and subprocesses interfering
with the primary task (e.g. creating noisier WM repre-
sentations due to drawing attention/capacity away from
the decision process) [53]. However, distinguishing
these accounts requires detailed choice-RT models
of the latent cognitive processes underlying memory-
based decision making (e.g. the highly successful evi-
dence accumulation framework, [54,55]), which are yet to
be applied to the reference-back paradigm. Before
discussing approaches to modelling the reference-back
task, we first review recent efforts to identify the neural
substrates  of WM subprocesses by correlating brain
activity with behavioural measures derived from the
reference-back.
Neural correlates of the reference-back task
As outlined above, there is broad consensus from neuro-
imaging supporting the role of BG, thalamus, and PFC in
WM gating as instantiated in the PBWM [27]. However,
the neural basis of several core WM subprocesses (e.g.
gate closing, updating, substitution) is less clear. Recent
work has begun to address this gap by linking behavioural
measures derived from the reference-back with neuro-
physiological measures such as EEG and fMRI
[47,49,51,52].
Two initial studies investigated EEG correlates of the
reference-back task. Rac-Lubashevsky and Kessler [51]
found that gate closing was associated with increased
theta power, a neural signature of cognitive control
[56–58], while gate opening and updating were associated
with increased delta power, a signature of reactive (event-
driven) control and action selection processes that engage
in response to reward prediction errors [59–61]. This
suggests a functional role for delta and theta signals in
the control of WM consistent with ‘go/no-go’ signalling in
the PBWM model [25,39,26]. A follow-up study explored
the role of the P3b EEG signal (a positive event-related
potential that signals task-relevant events and peaks
300 ms after stimulus onset) in gating and updating
[52]. P3b amplitude spiked depending on whether the
stimulus matched the WM reference item, implicating
P3b in stimulus comparison/categorisation processes
rather than updating per se. Greater negative activity
(in an N2-like ERP component unrelated to the P3b)
was found in anterior cortical regions on reference versus
comparison trials. This signal has been implicated in
controlled inhibition and action selection [62] and, in
the context of the reference-back task, likely reflects a
gate-opening or updating signal, consistent with the
PBWM’s assumption that reference trials trigger an
update or ‘go’ signal to allow new information into
WM. This initial work demonstrates that neural signa-
tures of specific updating and gating processes are detect-
able in EEG oscillatory signals that show activity broadly
consistent with ‘go/no-go’ signalling in BG-thalamus-
PFC pathways involved in WM gating [25,26]. However,Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2021, 38:57–65 the poor spatial resolution of EEG limits our ability to
draw conclusions about the specific structures associated
with each WM subprocess.
Extending this work, Nir-Cohen et al. [47] used 3T
fMRI to identify neural substrates of WM subprocesses
using a modified reference-back with more complex
face-morph stimuli. BG, frontoparietal cortex, and
task-relevant sensory areas such as visual cortex were
involved in gate opening. Gate closing activated parietal
cortex and substitution elicited activation in left dorso-
lateral PFC and inferior parietal lobule. A whole-brain
conjunction analysis revealed shared activity in the
supplementary motor area for updating and substitution,
while updating and gating both activated the posterior
parietal cortex. These results broadly agree with the
PBWM model [26] and support the role of BG and
PFC in controlling the flow of information into WM
and replacing old with new information. However, pari-
etal cortex activation during gate closing is not predicted
by the PBWM. This suggests that additional brain
structures are involved in controlling WM subprocesses
and points to an opportunity to extend the PBWM to
explain the neural basis of WM subprocesses beyond
gate opening.
Jongkees [49] provided further evidence for the dopa-
minergic basis of WM gating and updating processes by
administering dopamine precursor L-tyrosine to young
adults and comparing reference-back performance to a
placebo-control group. The L-tyrosine group had less
variable gate opening times than placebo controls, sug-
gesting that the drug improved WM performance for poor
performers but impaired high performers. There was no
effect on updating or gate closing, consistent with the role
of striatal dopamine signals in opening the gate to WM in
line with the PBWM [25,26]. Further indirect support for
striatal dopamine involvement comes from a study link-
ing event-based eye-blink rate (a proxy measure of striatal
dopamine) to WM updating in the reference-back task
[50]. However, follow-up work combining this approach
with ultra-high field fMRI is needed to identify how
activity in small subcortical structures as well as layers
in cortex (e.g. striatum, GP, thalamus, PFC) is modulated
by dopamine.
Current directions
The work reviewed above has taken important first
steps toward identifying the neural substrates of WM
subprocesses beyond the BG-thalamus-PFC ‘go/no-
go’ gating mechanism of the PBWM [39,26]. However,
existing work has so far been limited to relating brain
activity directly to the reference-back’s behavioural
measures rather than the latent cognitive processes
that give rise to behaviour. Model-based approaches
that link brain and behaviour via computational
cognitive models offer numerous advantages overwww.sciencedirect.com
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7 Note, however, that continuous resource models can mimic discrete
slots models. For example, if a resource pool has capacity to accommo-
date four items, then item fidelity may only begin to degrade once
demands exceed capacity (i.e. when n > 4), thus producing similar
predictions to a discrete slots model. Careful experimental design is
needed in order to correctly attribute effects to capacity limitations [99].traditional statistical analyses of mean RT and error
rate in understanding the cognitive and neural basis of
WM. For example, applying evidence accumulation
models of choice-RT (e.g. Refs. [54,55]) to reference-
back data would reveal whether performance costs
occur because WM subprocesses add time outside of
the decision stage (longer nondecision time), interfere
with the decision process itself (reduced or noisier
processing rate; [53]), or induce strategic adjustments
engaging top-down cognitive control (increased
response caution). Decomposing behavioural effects
(e.g. gating, updating costs) into a set of latent cogni-
tive processes (e.g. accumulation rate, nondecision
time, cognitive control of thresholds) rather than
coarse behavioural-level summary statistics enables
exploring the neural substrates of WM in greater detail
than is possible with traditional methods [63,64]. This
places stronger constraints on theory and ultimately
produces more robust and detailed inferences  about
the latent processes that generate behaviour. Applying
cognitive models to the reference-back holds great
promise in this regard.
In its standard form, the reference-back paradigm ignores
several important additional WM processes. These
include mechanisms that operate on information already
active in WM [65–67], such as object selection and
retrieval [7], item-specific removal ([23]; but see Ref.
[68], for evidence of removal in the reference-back),
and grouping and reorganization operations (e.g. sorting
items into alphabetical or chronological order, chunking
or grouping items together to form a single accessible
representation, changing the serial position of items;
[69–72]). These mechanisms support effective remem-
bering by restructuring information into more memorable
formats and ensuring only relevant information is main-
tained and retrieved from WM. The standard reference-
back also ignores phenomena associated with WM’s lim-
ited capacity (e.g. WM load/set-size effects; [73–75,7])
and the temporal degradation (e.g. by decay or interfer-
ence) of WM representations (for a review, see Ref. [76]).
Analyses that do not account for these processes risk
misattributing their effects to other processes, resulting
in biased inferences.
Simple extensions to the reference-back task (e.g. using
multiple-item WM sets, inserting delays between the
update cue and stimulus presentation), however, enable
testing such effects alongside the gating and updating
processes of the standard reference-back. For example,
Verschooren et al. [77] developed a modified reference-
back paradigm where one among several items in long-
term memory or perception is gated into WM. This allows
for comparing gating dynamics for perceptual versus long-
term memory information. Similar multiple-item modifi-
cations can be used to investigate some of the WM
phenomena described above, including informing thewww.sciencedirect.com ongoing debate about whether items in WM are held
in a small number of discrete high-precision slots [74] or
allocated capacity from a limited pool of continuous
resources [78–80]. In discrete slots models, the fidelity
of items in WM only degrades once all memory slots are
full (e.g. when n > 4). In continuous resource models, an
item’s fidelity is determined by its share of the available
resources and thus should degrade in inverse proportion
to the total number of items in WM7 . Evidence accumu-
lation models are well suited to test between these
competing accounts (e.g. via accumulation rate parame-
ters) as they can be used to assess the fidelity of WM
representations and measure capacity-sharing effects;
[74,81]). Varying set size in the reference-back and asses-
sing the effects on decision-making and WM processes (as
measured by cognitive models) could test between slots
and resource architectures. Similarly, combining a multi-
ple-item reference-back task with reinforcement learning
(e.g. by reinforcing some items but not others) could shed
light on the interplay between WM and learning (e.g.
Refs. [73,75]) and the role of expected value in WM-
based decisions. Overall, we believe that detailed choice-
RT modelling will play an important role in resolving
these important questions and in explaining additional
WM phenomena captured by variants of the reference-
back task.
Combining computational approaches with recent devel-
opments in ultra-high field fMRI (7T and higher) (e.g.
increased resolution and better signal- and contrast-to-
noise ratios) holds great promise for identifying activity in
small subcortical structures (e.g. GP, SN, subthalamic
nucleus, VTA; [82,83]) and gaining a deeper understand-
ing of their functional role in WM than is currently
available. For example, this would enable a stronger test
of the so-called ‘third phase’ response of the PBWM
model [27], which evaluates the updating process via
dopaminergic midbrain neurons that code reward predic-
tion errors [84]. Under the PBWM, midbrain dopamine
responses that train the BG when to update should no
longer occur once updating-related task rules have been
learned. This mechanism has proven difficult to verify
with low field strength fMRI [85,86], however, imaging
reference-back performance with ultra-high field fMRI
and linking neural measurements to cognitive model
parameters would enable identifying these anatomical
and functional mechanisms in greater detail and provide
additional constraint on cognitive models of WM. Spe-
cifically, when modelling two or more sources of data (e.g.
fMRI and choice-RT) simultaneously, the power to
detect joint effects (e.g. correlations between BOLDCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2021, 38:57–65
62 Computational cognitive neurosciencesignal and cognitive model parameters) is determined by
the signal-to-noise ratios of each data source. Increasing
the signal-to-noise ratio of neural data (e.g. via 7T fMRI;
[82]) reduces uncertainty throughout the model, as does
including data from additional modalities (e.g.
EEG + fMRI + behavioural; [87])8. A further benefit is
that connecting neural signals to cognitive model param-
eters allows for selecting between cognitive models that
make identical predictions at the level of choice-RT but
differ in their internal dynamics [45,64,88,89]. That is,
different internal mechanisms can be titrated by evaluat-
ing which is most consistent with the additional structure
provided by the neural data. Combining such approaches
with the reference-back task has potential to shed light on
other structures known to be involved in WM (e.g.
hippocampus; [90,91,92]), dopaminergic response evalu-
ation (e.g. VTA; [93,94]), and cognitive control (e.g.
anterior cingulate cortex; [95]), which are not yet
accounted for in existing neurocomputational models.
Linking state-of-the-art fMRI to the latent cognitive
processes engaged by the reference-back would offer
particular insight into the function of small dopamine-
producing midbrain structures, with implications for
understanding WM impairments in a range of clinical
disorders involving abnormal dopamine function [96].
Overall, we believe that viewing the reference-back task
through the lens of model-based cognitive neuroscience
promises a more detailed understanding of the subpro-
cesses that support WM and their neural substrates.
Concluding remarks
This review discussed recent efforts to identify the neural
basis of subprocesses that support WM in the recently
developed reference-back task. Current empirical work
supports the idea that WM gating is controlled by striatal
‘go/no-go’ signalling in BG-thalamus-PFC pathways.
However, the neural substrates of several additional
WM subprocesses are yet to be established, pointing to
a need for ultra-high field functional imaging combined
with detailed computational cognitive modelling. Targets
for future research include extending the reference-back
task to account for additional WM subprocesses (e.g.
removal, selection, and reorganization operations) and
effects of WM load and capacity (e.g. longer retrieval
times, noisier WM representations), as ignoring such
processes leads to mis-specified models and potentially
biased inferences. Applying the methods of model-based
cognitive neuroscience to the reference-back task would
provide a major advance in understanding WM at neural,
cognitive, and behavioural levels. A comprehensive
understanding of WM subprocesses and their neural basis
is within reach, with implications for both cognitive and
clinical neuroscience.8 This is particularly important for individual differences analyses,
which rely on precise measurement at the individual level to accurately
capture the variation between people.
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